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Abstract
We design envy-free mechanisms for the allocation of rooms and
rent payments among roommates. We achieve four objectives: (1)
each agent is allowed to make a report that expresses her preference
about violating her budget constraint, a feature not achieved by mech-
anisms that only elicit quasi-linear reports; (2) these reports are finite
dimensional; (3) computation is feasible in polynomial time; and (4)
incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms that elicit quasi-linear
reports are preserved.
JEL classification: C72, D63.
Keywords : market design, algorithmic game theory, equitable rent
division, no-envy, quasi-linear preferences, expressiveness.
1 Introduction
We design envy-free mechanisms for the allocation of rooms and payments
of rent among roommates who collectively lease a house. Our objective
is to account for agents’ budget constraints and the difficulty the agents
have in paying above these constraints. We show that this can be done
without losing the computational complexity and the incentive properties of
the mechanisms that are currently in use.
The so-called equitable rent allocation problem has attracted the atten-
tion of both economists and computer scientists (Gal et al., 2017;
∗Thanks to Ariel Procaccia for useful comments. All errors are my own.
†rvelezca@tamu.edu; https://sites.google.com/site/rodrigoavelezswebpage/home
1
Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018; see Velez, 2018, for a survey of incentives
related studies).1 Recently, the theoretical results of both fields have been
put in practice. Most prominently the not-for-profit fair allocation website
Spliddit.org (Goldman and Procaccia, 2014) has attracted thousands of
users to its fair rent calculator. Currently, this system asks roommates for
their values for the rooms and calculates an envy-free allocation that maxi-
mizes the minimum utility for that report. Generically there is a continuum
of envy-free allocations for each economy. Survey evidence suggests that the
maxmin utility selection is on a sweet spot that balances additional intuitive
criteria of equity (Gal et al., 2017).
Spliddit users have provided feedback on its performance. Among the
prominent issues that they have pointed to is that quasi-linear reports do not
allow them to express their budget restrictions (Procaccia et al., 2018). As
an answer to these requests, Procaccia et al. (2018) propose to ask agents
for both their valuation of the rooms and their budget constraint. Then
they determine, with a polynomial algorithm, whether the set of envy-free
allocations that satisfy the budget constraints for the reported quasi-linear
preference is non-empty. If this is so, they calculate an allocation that max-
imizes the minimum utility among agents in this set. If the set is empty,
they calculate an envy-free allocation for the reported values that is closest
to satisfy budget constrains. In this second case, an envy-free allocation with
respect to the reported values may not be envy-free for the agents’ real pref-
erences. It may not even be Pareto efficient. Essentially, the problem is that
by requesting only quasi-linear values and budget constraints we may not
get a good idea of the preference map of the agents when allotments involve
violations of their budget constraint (see Sec. 3 for a detailed discussion).
Obviously if one could ask the agents for their complete preference map
this would not be a problem. This is not realistic, however. Most impor-
tantly, even if it were feasible to ask for this information, we would have
two additional significant problems. The first is computational complexity
(Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018). The second is incentives. If agents’ re-
ports are required to be quasi-linear, for each complete information prior
(quasi-linear or not), the set of limit equilibrium outcomes of each envy-
free mechanism is the set of envy-free allocations for true preferences (Velez,
2015).2 This property is lost if agents can report arbitrary continuous utility
1Earlier complexity analyses are Aragones (1995) and Klijn (2000).
2The direct revelation game of a social choice function that selects envy-free allocations
may not have Nash equilibria unless it brake ties, i.e., selects among allocations that
are welfare equivalent for all agents, in elaborate and arguably impractical ways (Velez,
2018). By contrast, limit equilibria always exist for all such games. See Velez (2018) for
2
functions that are only restricted to be decreasing in payments of money for
each given room (Velez, 2015).
This leads us to state our desiderata for the redesign of an envy-free
mechanism with budget constraints: (1) agents should be allowed to make
reports that express their preferences about violating budget constraints; (2)
these reports should be finite dimensional; (3) computation of a maxmin util-
ity envy-free allocation, or another selection from the envy-free set, given the
reports should be feasible in polynomial time; and (4) incentive properties
of envy-free mechanisms that elicit quasi-linear reports should be preserved.
We submit that we can achieve these objectives by allowing each agent
to report valuations for each room, her budget constraint, and an additional
number that we interpret as an index that penalizes violations of the budget
constraint. Formally, if agent i receives room a and pays pi for it when her
budget constraint is bi and her budget violation index is ρi ≥ 1, this agent’s
utility is: via − pi − ρimax{0, pi − bi}. In practical terms, we can interpret
ρi as the interest rate at which agent i has access to credit.
Intuitively, this preference domain achieves our first objective of design
(see Sec. 3 for a discussion). Our second objective is obviously satisfied. It
remains to settle complexity and incentive issues.
1. We construct a polynomial algorithm, with input size the number
of agents, to compute a maxmin utility envy-free allocation for quasi-linear
budget constrained preferences for a fixed number of possible budget viola-
tion indices.
2. We prove that when the admissible domain of preferences is the quasi-
linear budget constrained preferences with an upper bound on the budget
valuation index, the set of limit equilibrium outcomes of each complete in-
formation game of any envy-free direct revelation mechanism, is the set of
envy-free allocations for true preferences.
3. The algorithms in 1 can be adapted to compute a selection of the
envy-free set that maximizes the minimum of linear transformation of rent
payments, or minimizes the maximum of linear transformation of utility
or rent payments. As an application, we show that there is a polynomial
algorithm that determines if a given economy admits an envy-free allocation
in which no agent is compensated to receive a room.
Our results are significant contributions to both theoretical computer
science, in particular computational fair division, and economics. We pro-
pose a mechanism for a relevant problem that arises because traditional
a discussion on the merits of the limit equilibrium prediction for these games.
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linear structures are not rich enough to represent real-world needs; we show
that this mechanism can be practically implemented; and by analyzing its
complete information incentives we advance our understanding of the extent
to which utility maximizing behavior can lead to suboptimal outcomes when
the mechanism is operated.
At a technical level, our paper is closely related with Arunachaleswaran
et al. (2018) who provide an algorithm that computes an envy-free allocation
for piece-wise linear preferences, a domain containing our budget constrained
preferences. The algorithm they construct does not allow one to choose a
specific allocation within the envy-free set, as the minmax utility allocation.
Our algorithm shares some features with Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018)’s,
of which we give a detailed account in Sec. 4. The novelty of our contribution
is that we leverage the topological structure and the monotonicity properties
of the envy-free set studied by Alkan et al. (1991) and Velez (2017) in order
to construct our algorithm and to provide a complete analysis of efficiency
and correctness. On the economics front, our paper joins the literature on
market design and in particular the incentives analysis of the rent division
problem. It is closely related with the papers that analyze incentives when
preferences may not be quasi-linear (Velez, 2011, 2015; Andersson et al.,
2014a,b; Fujinaka and Wakayama, 2015; see Velez, 2018 for a survey). We
provide details of this relationship in Sec. 5.
2 Model
A set of n objects, A, that we refer to as rooms, is to be allocated among
a set of n agents N ≡ {1, ..., n}. Generic rooms are a, b, .... Each agent
is to receive a room and pay an amount of money for it. Agent i generic
allotment is (ra, a) ∈ R × A. When ra ≥ 0 we interpret this as the amount
of money agent i pays to receive room a. We allow for negative payments
of rent, i.e., ra < 0. In this way we allow for alternative interpretations of
our model, as the allocation of tasks and salary. Each agent has a continu-
ous preference on her outcome space, i.e., a complete and transitive binary
relation on R×A that is represented by a continuous utility function. The
generic utility function is ui. We assume throughout that preferences sat-
isfy the following two properties:3 (1) money-monotonicity, i.e., for each
consumption bundle (ra, a) and each δ > 0, ui(ra + δ, a) < ui(ra, a); and
(2) compensation assumption, i.e., for each pair of rooms a and b, and each
ra ∈ R, there is tb ∈ R such that ui(ra, a) = ui(tb, b). Denote the domain of
3Our ordinal assumptions on preference imply existence of continuous representations.
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these preferences by U . Two finite-dimensional subdomains of preferences
are of interest to us.
Quasi-linear preferences: there is a vector (via)a∈A ∈ R
A such that agent
i’s utility from receiving room a and paying pi for it is via − pi. We denote
the domain of these preferences by Q.
Budget constrained quasi-linear preferences (with maximal budget viola-
tion index ρ > 0): the agent has underlying quasi-linear preferences with
values (via)a∈A, a budget constraint bi ≥ 0, and a proportional loss of utility
from violating her budget with coefficient ρi ∈ [0, ρ]. The agent’s utility
from receiving room a and paying pa for it is via − pa − ρimax{0, pa − bi}.
We denote the domain of these preferences by B.
Individual payments should add up tom ∈ R, the house rent. It is conve-
nient for us to consider a variable set of agents, rooms, and rent. This allows
us to describe redistribution of resources among subgroups. For C ⊆ A, let
U(C) be the space of preferences on R × C satisfying money-monotonicity
and the compensation assumption. Consistently, let Q(C) and B(C) be the
sub-domains of U(C) of quasi-linear and budget constrained quasi-linear
preferences, respectively. An economy is a tuple e ≡ (M,C, u, l) where
M ⊆ N , C ⊆ A is such that |C| = |M |, u ∈ U(C)M , and l ∈ R. Since
the set of agents N and resources A and m are fixed in our main results,
we simply describe an economy (N,A, u,m) by the profile u ∈ UN . An
allocation for (M,C, u, l) is a pair (r, σ) where σ : M → C is a bijection
and r ≡ (ra)a∈C is such that
∑
a∈C ra = l. The allotment assigned to agent
i by allocation (r, σ) is (rσ(i), σ(i)). We denote the set of allocations for
(M,C, u, l) by Z(M,C, l). We simplify and write Z for Z(N,A,m). An al-
location is envy-free for e ≡ (M,C, u, l) if no agent prefers the consumption
of any other agent at the allocation. The set of these allocations is F (e).
Let D ⊆ U . A social choice correspondence (scc) defined on DN as-
sociates with each u ∈ DN a set of allocations. The generic scc defined
on DN is G : DN ⇒ Z. We reserve the notation F for the scc that as-
sociates with each u ∈ UN the set of envy-free allocations for u. A social
choice function (scf) is a single-valued scc. The generic scf defined on DN
is g : DN → Z. We say that an scc G defined on DN is envy-free if for each
u ∈ DN , G(u) ⊆ F (u).
An scf g defined on a domain DN induces a direct revelation mechanism
in which each agent reports a preference in D and the outcome is the al-
location recommended by g for the reports. We denote this mechanism by
(N,DN , g) and the induced complete information game for preference profile
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u ∈ UN by (N,DN , g, u).4
Let D ⊆ U , u ∈ UN , g an scf, and ε > 0. A profile v ∈ DN is an
ε-equilibrium of (N,DN , g, u) if no agent can gain more than ε in util-
ity by choosing a different action, i.e., for each i ∈ N and each v′i ∈ D,
ui(g(v−i, v
′
i)) ≤ ui(g(v)) + ε. An allocation z is a limit Nash equilibrium
outcome of (N,DN , g, u) if there is a sequence of its ε-equilibrium outcomes
that converges to z as ε vanishes.
3 The problem
A direct revelation game, i.e., a game in which agents are asked to report
their private information, is different from a protocol in which agents report
a “message” which has the only purpose of allowing them to coordinate on
an allocation. In a direct revelation game, whose associated scf is based on
normative considerations, there is an implicit commitment of the mechanism
designer to achieve the normative goals he or she champions when the agents
provide the true reports.
Several issues may arise if the domain of admissible preferences in a
direct revelation game is not rich enough to approximate the agents’ true
preferences. First, strategy spaces may be confusing because they can be
asking for information that is not well defined. Think for instance of a
budget constrained agent who is asked to report her values for the different
rooms. What does this really mean? To alleviate this problem the mecha-
nism designer may have to resort to an alternative framing of the preference
query. For instance, in our rent allocation problem, Spliddit asks users to
assign a rent to each room in a way that the total rent is collected and
the agent is indifferent between receiving each room with the correspond-
ing rent. This question has always a true answer for each preference in
U . Moreover, when preferences are quasi-linear, it determines the complete
preference map. Calculating an envy-free allocation with quasi-linear values
elicited in this way may not lead to an envy-free allocation for the true pref-
erences, however. For instance, suppose that an agent reports the value of
room a is $500 and the value of room b is $300 when her budget constraint
is $400 because she is actually indifferent between these two bundles. The
system may recommend her to go to room b paying $200 while the agent
who is assigned room a pays $400 (this of course requires that there is at
least another agent in the problem). The agent will most likely prefer the
4Note that we refer to (N,DN , g, u) as a direct revelation game, even though u may
not be in DN .
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allotment of the agent who is assigned room a. Even thought the user may
be doing her best effort to answer truthfully, she finds that the systems does
not deliver on its promise to recommend an allotment in which she does not
prefer the allotment of any other agent.
It is difficult to assign responsibility to this specific issue, but the result
is that Spliddit users have explicitly asked for the system to account for
their budget constraint (Procaccia et al., 2018).
Allowing agents to report continuous utility functions that are decreas-
ing in payments is simply not realistic. One does not need to go that far to
achieve a better expressiveness of preferences, however. It is possible to en-
large the quasi-linear domain so the resulting space is determined by finitely
many parameters and also allows users to convey the information of their
budget constraint and the difficulty in violating it. Domain B is an obvious
candidate, first suggested by Velez (2018).
One can elicit the relevant information of a preference in B as follows.
First, as Spliddit, one can ask the agent to assign a rent to each room in a way
that the total rent is collected and the agent is indifferent between receiving
each room with the corresponding rent. Then ask for her budget constraint.
Finally, elicit the budget violation index whenever needed. There are three
cases.
1. The agent is budget constrained and the individual rents assigned to
the rooms are all weakly below the agent’s budget: In this case there is no
need to ask any further question. If one proceeds calculating an envy-free
allocation for a quasi-linear preference with the reported values, the agent
will always be assigned a room whose rent is below the budget constraint.
2. The agent assigns different rents to at least two rooms and at least
one rent is above the budget: If the rent assigned to each room is above
budget, let x be the minimal budget violation. Otherwise, let x be zero.
Then one can ask the agent for the equivalent of a rebate of x + 1 dollars
for the room that is assigned the higher rent and the one that is assigned
the lowest.5 To enforce reported preferences are in our admissible domain,
the agent can be given as options a subset of [x+1, x+ ρ¯]. (Our complexity
results will apply to a finite set of possible reports).
3. The agent assigns equal rents to each room (and all above budget): In
this case the agent has quasi-linear preferences represented by equal values.
If we are to calculate an ordinal selection from the envy-free set, as the one
5Here we are assuming that agents’ reports are required to be integer. If this is not so,
one can simply ask for the equivalent of a rebate x+ ε where ε is the lowest increment in
which agents can report differences in the rent assigned to rooms.
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that maximizes the minimal payment of rent, we do not need to inquire for
the budget violation index. If we are to calculate a cardinal selection, we
need to ask the agent to asses how difficult for him or her is to go over the
budget compared to the roommates, or to a certain population. Then, use
the corresponding statistic calculated from the population or an available
sample.6
Enlarging the domain of admissible preferences in the direct revelation
mechanism of an envy-free scf brings two challenges.
4 Complexity
The first practical issue that arises if one enlarges the domain of admis-
sible preferences to B is computational complexity. When preferences are
quasi-linear, an envy-free allocation can be computed in polynomial time
(Aragones, 1995; Klijn, 2000; Gal et al., 2017), as well as an envy-free al-
location that maximizes the minimum value of a set of linear functions of
the payoffs among all envy-free allocations (Gal et al., 2017). The most
prominent solution from this family, which is currently operated by Spliddit
(Gal et al., 2017), is the maxmin utility envy-free solution, i.e., for each
economy e recommend an element in
R(e) ≡ argmax
z∈F (e)
min
i∈N
ui(zi).
The following theorem summarizes our leading applications.
Theorem 1. Let (N,A, u,m) be such that u ∈ BN with associated ρ ∈
{ρ1, ..., ρk}
N for k fixed. Then, there are polynomial algorithms with input
size n that:
1. Compute a maxmin envy-free allocation for (N,A, u,m).
2. Compute an allocation that maximizes the minimum rent paid by an
agent in F (N,A, u,m). This algorithm determines if there is an allo-
cation in F (N,A, u,m) at which no agent is compensated.
We limit our presentation to the maxmin utility solution and discuss
extensions in Sec. 6.
6We could also use a lottery to elicit the index violation index assuming risk neutrality,
or also elicit risk preferences and adjust accordingly. These are overcomplicated schemes
that probably induce more noise in the reports than provide useful information, however.
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Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) introduced an algorithm that calcu-
lates an envy-free allocation when preferences are represented by piece-
wise linear functions, a domain containing B.7 When preferences are in
B and the number of different values of the budget violation index that an
agent can report is finite, say k, their algorithm runs in O(nk+c) for some
c > 0 (Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018, Sec. 4.1).8 Their algorithm does
not produce an allocation satisfying further criteria, as the maxmin util-
ity or maxmin rent. Since our approach shares a similar philosophy with
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018)’s, it is convenient for our purposes to first
explain how their algorithm works, its relationship with the so-called Per-
turbation Lemma of Alkan et al. (1991), and then introduce our algorithms
and analysis.
The essential step of the algorithms that we will discuss and construct
is the following. Starting from an envy-free allocation, decrease the rent of
each room and reshuffle rooms so no-envy is preserved. This is always locally
possible. For each piece-wise linear u, and each (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), there
is ε > 0 such that for each δ ∈ (0, ε) there is (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m− δ) such
that for each a ∈ A, ta < ra Alkan et al. (1991). A discussion of this result
is relevant to develop intuition for our algorithms.
Definition 1. For each u ∈ BN and r ∈ RA, let SBu(r) ≡ {(i, a) ∈ N ×A :
ra > bi}, B
u(r) ≡ {(i, a) ∈ N ×A : ra ≥ bi}, and for each i ∈ N and a ∈ A,
νia(u, r) and λia(u, r) be such that for some ε > 0 and each r
δ
a ∈ [ra, ra− ε],
ui(r
δ
a, a) = νia(u, r)− λia(u, r)r
δ
a.
Let (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). A rebate of rent is a vector x ∈ RA++ and
a reshuffle is a bijection µ : N → A. At rebate and reshuffle (x, µ) at r,
agent i receives bundle (rµ(i) − xµ(i), µ(i)). Utility function u induces a
utility function on rebates and reshuffles at r, given by (xa, a) 7→ ui(ra −
xa, a). Suppose that agent i is indifferent between bundles (ra, a) and (rb, b).
7A piece-wise linear utility function has the form (ri, a) 7→ vias−λiasri for a collection
of consecutive intervals {Iias}a∈A,s∈Si that covers R. Even though we will state all our
results for our domain B, they all generalize for the piece-wise linear domain when we
require for each i, |Si| is polynomial in n.
8The leading algorithm in Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) solves the case in which slopes
are integer powers of a given (1 + ε). With this they construct an approximate envy-free
allocation for an arbitrary piece-wise linear economy. The approximation is polynomial in
1/ε. Since our objective is to provide more expressive but simple preferences to the agents,
we prefer to present only results for finitely many slopes. The generalization of this results
when one allows agents provide reports for the budget violation index in an interval and
then calculate an approximate envy-free allocation for this economy are guaranteed by
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) approximation technique.
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Then her preferences between rebates with these rooms are linear for a
neighborhood of zero. That is, for each rebate x small enough, (ra − xa, a)
is at least as good as (rb−xb, b) if and only if λia(u, r)xa ≥ λib(u, r)xb. Each
agent may not be indifferent among all bundles in (r, σ). Thus the economy
of rebates and reshuffles may not be linear. However, since we aim to rebate
only a small amount of money, we can linearize this economy as follows.
Definition 2. For each u ∈ BN , (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), Λ > 0, i ∈ N ,
and a ∈ A, let λia(u, r,Λ) ≡ λia(u, r) if ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a), and
λia(u, r,Λ) ≡ Λ otherwise.
9
Lemma 1. Let u ∈ BN and (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). There is Λ > 0, such
that for each 0 < Λ′ < Λ, if µ is a solution to
max
γ:N→A, γ a bijection
∑
i∈N
log(λiγ(i)(u, r,Λ
′)),
then for each i ∈ N , ui(rµ(i), µ(i)) = ui(rσ(i), σ(i)).
Proofs omitted in the body of the paper are presented in the Appendix.
Definition 3. Let u ∈ BN and (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). A linearized rebates
and reshuffles economy for u at (r, σ) is an economy in which consumption
space is R++×A, and preferences are represented, for Λ satisfying the prop-
erty in Lemma 1, by: for each i ∈ N and xa > 0, (xa, a) 7→ λia(u, r,Λ)xa.
Let u ∈ BN and (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). A linearized rebates and reshuf-
fles economy for u at (r, σ) is isomorphic to a quasi-linear rent allocation
economy in which preferences are strictly increasing in money, i.e., an econ-
omy in which the alternatives space is R × A and agents have preferences
(ya, a) 7→ uˆ(ya, a) ≡ log λia(u, r,Λ) + ya. Thus, we can use all the power of
the results for the quasi-linear domain in this economy. In particular, let µ
be an assignment that maximizes
∑
i∈N λiµ(i)(u, r,Λ) and let ε ∈ R. There is
(y, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ, ε) (Alkan et al., 1991). Since the economy is quasi-linear,
for each η ∈ R, ((ya + η)a∈A, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ, ε + nη). Thus, by the Inter-
mediate Value Theorem, for each ε > 0 we can construct an allocation in
the linearized rebates and reshuffles economy (y, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya)
such that
∑
a∈A exp(ya) = ε. We have the problem that utility values in
the linearized economy does not correspond exactly to our original rebate
and reshuffles economy. However, if ε is chosen close enough to zero, for
9Note that λia(u, r,Λ) is well defined, i.e., it is invariant for the choice of σ as long as
(r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m).
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each i ∈ N , if ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), then ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra − ε, a).
Thus, the preferences statements that pass from the linearized rebates and
reshuffles economy to the original rebates and reshuffles economy are enough
to guarantee that (r − exp(y), µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − ε).
The following graphs allow us to summarize the discussion above in one
lemma.
Definition 4 (Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018). For u ∈ BN and (r, σ) ∈
F (N,A, u,m), let F(r) ≡ (N,A,E) be the bipartite graph were (i, a) ∈ E
if ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a); and F
u(r) ≡ (N,A,E,w) the weighted version
of F(r) were for each (i, a) ∈ E, w(i, a) ≡ log λia(u, r).
Lemma 2 (Perturbation Lemma; Alkan et al., 1991; Arunachaleswaran
et al., 2018). Let (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). Suppose that u is piece-wise linear
and µ is a maximum weight perfect matching in Fu(r). Then, there is ε > 0
such that for each δ ∈ [0, ε], there is (rδ, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ) such that
for each a ∈ A, rδa > r
η
a.10
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) leverage Lemma 2 to construct a polyno-
mial algorithm to find an envy-free allocation in a piece-wise linear economy
in which the slopes in the different intervals comes from a finite set say of
cardinality k. The essential step in this task is the following. Given η > 0,
starting from an envy-free allocation (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m) with u ∈ BN ,
rebate η > 0 so no-envy and budget violations are preserved. Lemma 2 itself
does not solve this problem, i.e., stacking the εs produced by the lemma,
may not allow one to reach a rebate of η (Alkan, 1989). Arunachaleswaran
et al. (2018)’s breakthrough is to realize that this can be done by concate-
nating the solution of the following linear program for a maximal weight
perfect matching in Fu(r), µ:
maxt∈RA
∑
a∈A ta
s.t. : ta ≤ ra ∀a ∈ A
νiµ(i)(u, r)− λiµ(i)(u, r)tµ(i) ≥ νiµ(j)(u, r)− λiµ(j)(u, r)tµ(j) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N
ta ≤ bi ∀(i, a) ∈ SB
u(t)∑
a∈A ta ≥
∑
a∈A ra − η.
(1)
This problem is feasible because r is in the option set. Thus, let (t, σ) be
the allocation associated with its solution. Since t satisfies the second set of
constraints in (1), the allocation is in F (N,A, u,m− ε) for some 0 < ε ≤ η.
Thus, one of the following is true: (i) the solution is in F (N,A, u,m − η);
10Lemma 3, which we prove in detail in the Appendix, implies Lemma 2.
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Algorithm 1 Initializes search of maxmin utility envy-free allocation.
Input: (N,A, u,m) were u ∈ BN is associated with (via)i∈N,a∈A,
(bi)i∈N , and (ρi)i∈N ∈ {ρ1, ..., ρk}
N .
Onput: M ≥ m and an allocation in R(N,A, u,M).
1: For each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A, let Via ≡ (via+ ρibi)/(1+ ρi) and u˜i the
function (xa, a) 7→ u˜i(xa, a) ≡ (1 + ρi)(Via − xa).
2: Let m′ ≡ n
(
maxi∈N,{a,b∈}⊆A Vib − Via +maxj∈N bj
)
.
3: Let σ be an assignment that maximizes
∑
i∈N Viσ(i).
4: Compute a price vector r ∈ RA by solving the linear program
maxR,r∈RA R
s.t. : R ≤ u˜i(r, σ) ∀i ∈ N
Viσ(i) − rσ(i) ≥ Viσ(j) − rσ(j) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N∑
a∈A ra = max{m,m
′}
5: Returns M ≡
∑
a∈A ra and (r, σ).
(ii) the solution hit one of the Bu(r) constraints; or (iii) σ is not a maximal
weight perfect matching in Fu(t). (If these three conditions simultaneously
fail, by Lemma 2, t would not be a solution to the problem.) If one repeats
this starting from the previously computed allocation, eventually case (i) or
(ii) happen in O(nk−1), because since there are k values for the slopes of
the intervals, the maximum number of values for a maximal weight perfect
matching in Fu(s) for any s ∈ RA is bounded above by (n+ 1)k−1.
Thus, for k constant, one can construct a polynomial algorithm that
stops in O(nk+cς), where ς is the number of intervals in the piece-wise linear
representation of preferences. In our case, with preferences in B, ς is bounded
above by 2n2. Thus, the algorithm runs in O(nk+c).
A solution to (1) leads us to a random envy-free allocation. We would
like to be able to direct the algorithm to optimize some further criteria.
The following algorithms calculate in polynomial time a maxmin envy-
free allocation for an economy (N,A, u,m) with preferences in B. The
first, Algorithm 1, calculates a maxmin envy-free allocation for an economy
(N,A, u,M) for some M ≥ m that is selected high enough so all budget
constraints are violated necessarily.
Algorithm 1 initializes our search by looking for an allocation for a rent
M that is high enough so we make sure that all budget constraints will
be violated for each agent, for each consumption of the agent or the other
agents, at each possible envy-free allocation for (N,A, u,M). For such a
12
high rent preferences are quasi-linear in the range of the consumption space
that contains all envy-free allocations for (N,A, u,M). Thus, one can find a
maxmin allocation by essentially using Gal et al. (2017)’s algorithm for this
quasi-linear preference (lines 3-4).
Theorem 2. For k fixed, Algorithm 1 stops in polynomial time with input
size n. Given input (N,A, u,m) where u ∈ B, the algorithm returns M and
(r, σ) such that M ≥ m and (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M).
Proof. Lines 1 and 2 are direct definitions. Line 3 is well known to be poly-
nomial in n. For line 4 we should note that it is indeed a linear program,
because all u˜s are linear in r (at this point σ is fixed). It is feasible be-
cause given a quasi-linear economy and an assignment σ that maximizes
the summation of values, there is always an envy-free allocation for that
economy with that assignment (Alkan et al., 1991). Because of the second
and third sets of constraints in the program, the feasible set is compact.
Thus, the program has a solution. Since the number of constraints in the
program is polynomial in n, the complexity of solving this problem is known
to be polynomial in n. Let M and (r, σ) be the output of the algorithm.
Clearly, M ≥ m. We claim that (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M). Since for each
i ∈ N , (1 + ρi) > 0, profile u˜ is ordinally equivalent to the quasi-linear pro-
file with values V . Thus, the solution of the linear program in line 4 solves
maxr∈RA:(r,σ)∈F (N,A,u˜,M)minl∈L u˜i(rσ(i), σ(i)).
Let (t, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u˜,M). Since u˜ is ordinally equivalent to a quasi-
linear preference and {(r, σ), (t, µ)} ⊆ F (N,A, u˜,M), (t, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u˜,M)
(Svensson, 2009). Moreover, by Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991), for each i ∈
N , u˜i(tµ(i), µ(i)) = u˜i(tσ(i), σ(i)). Thus, minl∈L u˜i(tσ(i), σ(i)) =
minl∈L u˜i(tµ(i), µ(i)). Since minl∈L u˜i(rσ(i), σ(i)) ≥minl∈L u˜i(tσ(i), σ(i)), then
(r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u˜,M).
We claim that F (N,A, u˜,M) = F (N,A, u,M) and for each (t, µ) ∈
F (N,A, u,M), u(tµ(i), µ(i)) = u˜(tµ(i), µ(i)). Let t ∈ R
A be such that,∑
a∈A ta = M and µ : N → A a bijection. Then, there is i ∈ N such
that ti ≥
(
maxi∈N,{a,b∈}⊆A Vib − Via +maxj∈N bj
)
. Then, ti ≥ bi. Thus,
ui(ti, µ(i)) = u˜i(ti, µ(i)) = (1 + ρi)(Viµ(i) − ti). Now, Viµ(i) − ti ≤ Viµ(i) −
maxi∈N,{a,b∈}⊆A Vib − Via −maxj∈N bj . Thus, for each a ∈ A, Viµ(i) − ti ≤
Viµ(i) − (Viµ(i) − Via)−maxj∈N bj = Via −maxj∈N bj . Thus, for each a ∈ A,
ui(ti, µ(i)) = u˜i(ti, µ(i)) ≤ ui(maxj∈N bj, a) = u˜i(maxj∈N bj , a). Suppose
that (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u˜,M). Thus, for each a ∈ A, ta ≥ maxj∈N bj , for
otherwise u˜i will envy the agent who receives a at (t, µ). Thus, for each pair
{i, j} ⊆ N , ui(tµ(j), µ(j)) = u˜i(tµ(j), µ(j)). Since (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u˜,M),
for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N , ui(tµ(i), µ(i)) ≥ ui(tµ(j), µ(j)). Thus, (t, µ) ∈
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F (N,A, u,M). Suppose then that (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,M). A symmetric
argument shows that (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u˜,M).
Since F (N,A, u˜,M) = F (N,A, u,M); for each (t, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,M)
and each i ∈ N , u(tµ(i), µ(i)) = u˜(tµ(i), µ(i)), and (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u˜,M), we
have that (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M).
If Algorithm 1 returns M = m, we have actually computed an element
of R(N,A, u,m). Thus, we need to continue our search only when this
algorithm returns M > m and (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M). Algorithm 2 does
so. This algorithm shares some of its philosophy with Arunachaleswaran
et al. (2018)’s. At a given state in which an allocation in R(N,A, u,m′)
with m′ > m has been calculated, it reshuffles rooms and rebates rent by
solving (2), an LP that maximizes the minimum value of the uis constrained
by budget regime changes.
As in Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018)’s algorithm, solving (2) gets us
closer to collecting exacly rent m. The solution to this problem, ts, may
be such that (ts, σs) 6∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a), however. There are two issues
that cause this problem. First, (2) has constraints additional to the envy-
free ones. Second, since preferences are not quasi-linear, we do not know
that a given assignment that admits an envy-free allocation necessarily ad-
mits a maxmin utility envy-free allocation —this is the reason why Gal et al.
(2017)’s algorithm works in the quasi-linear domain. Thus, since our objec-
tive is a maxmin utility envy-free allocation, it is plausible that this step
may overshoot rebating rent and lose the maxmin property.
Thus, if the solution of (2) excessively reduces rent, i.e., line 11 is reached,
we need to correct the situation. We do so by grabbing the value of (2),
Rs, and increase rents again constrained by no-envy and maxmin utility Rs,
i.e., we solve (3). It turns out that the solution to (3) fits the bill, i.e., it
is a maxmin utility envy-free allocation with value Rs. Most importantly,
and here is where the subtlety of our analysis resides, compared with ts,
the solution to (3) does not decrease any of the fundamental measures of
progress in our algorithm. That is, at a solution of (3), rs, either σs is not a
maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(rs) or a new budget constraint was
released.
Theorem 3. For k fixed, Algorithm 2 stops in polynomial time with in-
put size n. Given input (N,A, u,m) where u ∈ B, its output belongs to
R(N,A, u,m).
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Algorithm 2 Calculates a maxmin envy-free allocation.
Input: (N,A, u,m), u ∈ BN , b ≡ (bi)i∈N , ρ ≡ (ρi)i∈N ∈ {ρ1, ..., ρk}
N ,
M > m, and (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,M).
Onput: an allocation in R(N,A, u,m).
1: Initialize s← 0
2: Let (rs, σs) ≡ (r, σ)
3: while
∑
a∈A r
s
a > m do
4: Update s← s+ 1
5: For each i ∈ N and a ∈ A, let u˜si (ta, a) ≡ ν
s
ia(u, r)− λ
s
ia(u, r)ta
6: Let σs be a maximum weight perfect matching in Fu(rs−1)
7: Let ts ∈ RA and Rs be solution and value of the following LP
maxR,ts∈RA R
s.t. : tsa ≤ r
s−1
a ∀a ∈ A
R ≤ u˜si (t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ∀i ∈ N
u˜si (t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ≥ u˜si (t
s
σs(j), σ
s(j)) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N
tsa ≥ bi ∀(i, a) ∈ SB
u(rs−1)∑
a∈A t
s
a ≥ m
(2)
8: if (ts, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a) then
9: rs ← ts.
10: else
11: Let rs be the solution to the following LP
maxrs∈RA
∑
a∈A r
s
a
s.t. : rsa ≥ t
s
a ∀a ∈ A
Rs ≤ u˜si (r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ∀i ∈ N
u˜si (r
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) ≥ u˜si (r
s
σs(j), σ
s(j)) ∀{i, j} ⊆ N
(3)
12: end if
13: end while
14: Return (rs, σs).
The first step in the proof of the theorem is to realize that the Perturba-
tion Lemma can be strengthened to guarantee that perturbations preserve
the maxmin utility property.
Lemma 3 (h-maxmin Perturbation Lemma). Let (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m).
Suppose that u is piece-wise linear and µ is a maximum weight perfect match-
ing in Fu(r). Then, there is ε > 0 and a continuous function δ ∈ [0, ε] 7→
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(rδ, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m−δ) such that (r0, µ) = (r, µ); and for each pair δ < η,
and each i ∈ N , ui(r
η
µ(i), µ(i)) > ui(r
δ
µ(i), µ(i)), and for each a ∈ A, r
δ
a > r
η
a.
Intuitively, Lemma 3 guarantees that the solution to (2) will decrease the
aggregate rent we are collecting. Now, suppose that we are at some iteration
of Algorithm 2 for s > 0 in which we find that (ts, σs) 6∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a).
Intuitively the solution of (3) will bring us back to an element ofR(N,A, u,m′)
for some m′ <
∑
a∈A t
s
a. This is not enough to guarantee the algorithm will
stop. In order for this to be so, it must be the case that the set of aggregate
rents m′ <
∑
a∈A t
s
a for which there is an allocation with assignment σ
s in
R(N,A, u˜,m′) is connected. Imagine that there is a lacuna, i.e., some inter-
val (m1,m2) for which no such allocation exist. If the solution to (2) jumps
to
∑
a∈A t
s
a ∈ (m1,m2), then the solution to (3) may bring us back to m2,
and the while loop may get trapped in an infinite cycle.
Thus, to prove Theorem 3 we need to guarantee the connectedness prop-
erties of the aforementioned set (Lemma 5 below). Note that by Lemma 3,
a maximal lacuna, say (m1,m2), cannot exist for m2 for which there is
(t, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,m2) such that σ
s is a maximal weight perfect match-
ing in Fu(t). Thus, we can prove that such a lacuna does not exist by
establishing a converse to Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 (Converse perturbation lemma). Let u ∈ BN , ε > 0, (r, σ) ∈
F (N,A, u,m) and (t, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − ε) such that for each a ∈ A,
ra > ta. Suppose that B
u(r) = Bu(t). Then, σ is a maximal weight perfect
matching in Fu(r).
Let u ∈ BN . For each (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m) and each µ that is a
maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(r), let ε((r, σ), u, µ) ≡ sup{ε > 0 :
∀δ ∈ [0, ε],∃(rδ , µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ)}.
Lemma 5. Let u ∈ BN , (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m), µ a maximal weight perfect
matching in Fu(r), and ε ≡ ε((r, σ), u, µ). Then,
1. ε > 0.
2. If ε < +∞, then
(a) ε = max{ε′ > 0 : ∀δ ∈ [0, ε′],∃(rδ, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ)}.
(b) If (rε, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − ε), then µ is not a maximal weight
perfect matching in Fu(rε).
(c) There is no η > ε such that for some rη ∈ RA such that
∑
a∈A r
η
a =
m− η and Bu(rη) = Bu(rε), (rη, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − η).
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Proof of Theorem 3. We prove that the processes in each line of the algo-
rithm are well defined and can be individually completed in polynomial time.
Then we bound the number of times the while loop is visited.
For each s ≥ 1, (rs−1, σs) ∈ F (N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s−1
a ), because it is either
the input when s = 0 or the solution to either (2) or (3), which have no-
envy constraints. As long as (rs−1, σs) ∈ F (N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s−1
a ), r
s−1 is in
the feasible set of (2). Because of the first and last constraints, this set
is compact. Thus, it has a solution. Since it is a linear program with a
polynomial number of constraints, it can be computed in polynomial time.
Line 9 can be completed in polynomial time, i.e., given ts ∈ RA and σs :
N → A a bijection, (t, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A ta) is verifiable in polynomial
time. By Velez (Proposition 5.9 2018), this problem is equivalent to check
that the allocation is envy-free and that for a given directed graph with n
nodes, there is a path from each node to a given set of nodes.
Because of the first and second constraint in (3), the feasible set in this
program is compact.11 Since ts belongs to this feasible set, the program has
a solution.
We claim that the algorithm stops. Moreover, if it returns (rs, σs), s is
bounded by nk+2. Thus, the algorithm runs in O(nk+c) for some c > 2.
Suppose that we update s in line 4,
∑
a∈A r
s−1
a > m, and (r
s−1, σs−1) ∈
R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s−1
a ). Let t
s be the solution to (2). Then, (ts, σs) ∈
F (N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a). Thus, σ
s is a perfect matching in Fu(ts). There are
two cases.
Case 1: (ts, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a). If
∑
a∈A t
s
a = m, the algorithm
terminates. Suppose then that
∑
a∈A t
s
a > m. We claim that it must be
the case that either there is (i, a) ∈ SBu(rs−1) such that tsa = bi, or σ
s is
not a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(ts). Suppose by contradic-
tion that for each (i, a) ∈ SBu(rs−1), tsa > bi, and σ
s is a maximal weight
perfect matching in Fu(ts). By Lemma 3, there is δ > 0 and tδ ∈ RA
such that (tδ, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ); for each a ∈ A, tδa < t
s
a ≤ r
s−1
a ;
for each (i, a) ∈ SBu(rs−1), tδa > bi; and
∑
a∈A t
δ
a > m; and for each
i ∈ N , ui(t
δ
σs(i), σ
s(i)) > ui(t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)). Since for each (i, a) ∈ Bu(rs−1),
tδa > bi, then for each i ∈ N , u˜i(t
δ
σs(i), σ
s(i)) > u˜i(t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)). Thus,
mini∈N u˜
s
i (t
s
σs(i), σ
s(i)) < mini∈N u˜
s
i (t
δ
σs(i), σ
s(i)). Thus, ts is not a solution
to (2). This is a contradiction.
Case 2: (ts, σs) 6∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A t
s
a). Let r
s be the solution of (3). We
claim that (rs, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s
a). Since (r
s−1, σs−1) ∈ R(N,A, u,∑
a∈A r
s−1
a ), by Lemma 3, mini∈N u˜i(r
s−1
σs(i), σ
s(i)), u˜i) < R
s. Thus,
11Even if utility was not linear, this program is compact because Rs is the value of (2).
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mini∈N u˜i(r
s−1, σs) < mini∈N u˜i(r
s, σs). Let i ∈ N . Using the notation
in Definition 6 in the Appendix, by Velez (Proposition 5.9 2018), there is j ∈
argmini∈N u˜i(r
s−1
σs(i), σ
s(i)), such that i→u˜,(rs−1,σs) j. Thus, u˜j(r
s
σs(j), σ
s(j)) >
u˜j(r
s−1
σs(j), σ
s(j)). By Velez (2018, Lemma 5.7), rs
σs(i) < r
s−1
σs(i). Thus, for each
a ∈ A, rs < rs−1.
Let ε ≡ ε((rs−1, σs), u, σs) and (rε, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s−1−ε). Let
Rε ≡ mini∈N u˜i(r
ε, σs). We claim that Rs ≤ Rε. Suppose by contradiction
that Rs > Rε. Then, for each a ∈ N , rsa < r
ε
a. Since B
u(rs) = Bu(rε),
by Lemma 4, σs is a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(rε). This
contradicts Lemma 5. For each δ ∈ [0, ε], there is a unique rδ ∈ RA such that
(rδ, σs) ∈ R(N,A, u,
∑
a∈A r
s−1− δ) (Alkan et al., 1991). The function δ 7→
rδ is strictly decreasing and continuous (Velez, 2017). By the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there is δ ∈ [0, ε] such that Rδ ≡ mini∈N ui(r
δ, σs) = Rs.
Then, for each a ∈ A, rs ≤ rδ. Then, rδ is feasible in (3). Note that since
rs solves (3), then
∑
a∈A r
s
a ≥
∑
a∈A r
δ
a. Thus, r
δ = rs. Thus, (rs, σs) ∈
R(N,A, u,m− δ). Note that (rs, σs) solves (2). Thus, by Case 1, either the
algorithm stops or either there is (i, a) ∈ SBu(rs−1) such that tsa = bi, or σ
s
is not a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(ts).
By Case 1 and 2, each time that s is updated, either |SBu(rs)| <
|SBu(rs−1)| or the weight of σs in Fu(rs−1) is greater than the weight of
σs−1 in Fu(rs−2). There are at most n2 elements in SBu(r0) and at most
(n+1)k−1 values for the weight of a perfect matching. Thus, the algorithm
either stops or reaches a state in which SBu(rs) = ∅ in O(nk+c) for some
c > 0. If SBu(rs) = ∅, the algorithm returns the solution to (2) in the
next while loop iteration because then u˜s becomes quasi-linear and thus
ε((rs, σs+1), u˜, σs+1) = +∞.
5 Incentives
If only quasi-linear reports are allowed, the direct revelation mechanism of
each envy-free scf has the property that all of its non-cooperative outcomes
are always envy-free allocations.12
Theorem 4 (Velez, 2018). Let g be an envy-free scf defined on QN . Then,
for each u ∈ UN the set of limit equilibrium outcomes of (N,QN , g, u)
is F (u).
12Dominant strategy implementation is impossible in this setting (Alkan et al., 1991;
Tadenuma and Thomson, 1995; Velez, 2018).
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Incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms may be lost by enlarging
the set of admissible reports. Indeed, one can construct an envy-free g and a
profile u ∈ QN for which there is a limit equilibrium outcome of (N,UN , g, u)
that is neither envy-free nor Pareto efficient for u (Velez, 2015). The known
examples require profiles of reports that are outside B. Intuitively, the
issue seems to arise because agents exaggerate the sensitivity they have to
increases of rent for the room they receive. Thus, it is plausible that a result
like Theorem 4 holds when the admissible domain of preferences is enlarged
to B. Our main result in this section states that this is actually so.
Theorem 5. Let g be an envy-free scf defined on BN . Then, for each
u ∈ UN , the set of limit equilibrium outcomes of (N,BN , g, u) is F (u).
One can see Theorem 5 as the conjunction of two independent state-
ments. First, when reports are constrained to be in B, each limit equilibrium
outcome of the direct revelation game of an envy-free scf is envy-free for the
true preferences. Second, each envy-free allocation for true preferences is a
limit equilibrium outcome of the direct revelation game of an envy-free scf.
We will concentrate on providing intuition for the first statement. Lemma 7,
which is stated at the end of this section and follows from a somehow stan-
dard argument, reveals that the second statement holds for any enlargement
of the quasi-linear domain.
The reason why extending the set of reports in an envy-free mechanism
can create unwanted limit equilibria is the same reason why proving The-
orem 5 is a somehow subtle problem: A limit equilibrium outcome is not
the precise recommendation for a given report; it is the limit of recommen-
dations for a sequence of reports that can be increasingly apart from each
other as the outcome accumulates towards a limit. Thus, the risk is that
for each agent, say agent i, the sequence of reports of the other agents can
make it increasingly difficult for agent i to grab some gains that he or she
would be able to get if the other reports were fixed.
Thus, proving Theorem 5 requires two essential tasks. First, we need to
understand what are the restrictions that are imposed on a profile of reports
because it admits an envy-free allocation that is close to a certain outcome.
Second, we need to understand what are the possibilities to manipulate an
envy-free mechanism that arise because the profile satisfies these properties.
We advance our understanding of these questions in Lemmas 9-11 (see Ap-
pendix), which allow us to prove the following theorem, which summarizes
our findings. Essential to the proof of these lemmas and the theorem is
Velez (2018)’s strengthened form of the Maximal Manipulation Theorem of
Andersson et al. (2014a,b) and Fujinaka and Wakayama (2015). This result
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identifies the supremum of the utility values that an agent can get by ma-
nipulating an envy-free mechanism given that the other agents’ reports are
fixed.
Consider a given allocation at which agent i envies another agent, say
agent j. Let η > 0 be the additional rent that would have to be added to the
rent of the room of agent j so agent i is indifferent between this allotment and
her consumption. The theorem states that there are universal proportions
ω1 and ω2, i.e., they depend only on n and the maximal budget violation
index, for which the following holds. There is a quasi-linear preference that
agent i can report and guarantees that as long as an envy-free allocation is
chosen for the preference report, her allotment will be at least as good as
the worst of a rent rebate in her room of at least ω1η, or receiving the room
of agent j but paying at most what j was paying plus ω2η.
Theorem 6 (Strong Manipulation). There are {ω1, ω2} ⊆ (0, 1) such that
for each v ∈ BN , each z ≡ (r, µ) ∈ F (v), each i ∈ N , each ui ∈ U , and
each j ∈ N such that ui(zj)− ui(zi) > 0, there is v
′
i ∈ Q such that, for each
s ∈ F (v−i, v
′
i),
ui(si) ≥ min
{
ui
(
rµ(i) − ω1η, µ(i)
)
, ui
(
rµ(j) + ω2η, µ(j)
)}
,
where η > 0 is such that ui(rµ(j) + η, µ(j)) = ui(zi).
Theorem 6 suggests that when reports are required to be in B, ε-equilibrium
outcomes of the direct revelation game of an envy-free scf cannot converge,
as ε vanishes, to an outcome that violates no-envy. If this were so, the gain
from manipulation guaranteed by the theorem would have a lower bound
above from zero as ε vanishes. The following Lemma formalizes this result.
Lemma 6. Let Q ⊆ D ⊆ B and g an envy-free scf defined on DN . Then
for each u ∈ UN , each limit equilibrium outcome of (N,DN , g, u) belongs to
F (u).
The converse of this result completes our proof of Theorem 5.13
Lemma 7. Let Q ⊆ D ⊆ U and g an envy-free scf defined on DN . Then for
each u ∈ UN , each z ∈ F (u) is a limit equilibrium outcome of (N,DN , g, u).
6 Discussion
We have shown that the operator of a maxmin utility envy-free direct rev-
elation mechanism for rent division problems can enlarge the domain of
13Note that Lemmas 6 and 7 together also imply Theorem 4.
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admissible reports from the quasi-linear domain to the budget constrained
quasi-linear domain without losing its complexity and incentive properties.
Perhaps the most interesting question that our study opens is to evaluate
the extent to which a preference elicitation scheme as the one proposed in
Sec. 3 can indeed deliver and allow agents to better inform the mechanism
designer about their preferences and needs. This is a question of empirical
and experimental nature that we leave for further research.
As outlined in the introduction, our complexity results generalize for
other selections of the envy-free set. Note that the space of piece-wise linear
functions is closed under positive affine linear transformations. Thus, our
results directly apply to compute an envy-free allocation that maximizes
an agent-wise positive affine linear transformation of utility. Or results also
apply to the computation of an envy-free allocation that maximizes the min-
imum of a positive affine linear transformation of rent payments. More pre-
cisely, one can compute an allocation in argmax(r,σ)∈F (e)mina∈A(αa+βara).
To do so one only needs to replace in the linear programs of Algorithms 1
and 2 the constraints that maximize the minimum utility by the constraints
that maximize the minimum transformed rent payments. These constraints
are again linear functions of the choice variables in the program. One can
also modify Algorithms 1 and 2 so they also handle the minimization of the
maximum of an affine linear transformation of utilities, or an affine linear
transformation of rents. This can be done by replacing the LPs in them with
corresponding minimization programs where the minimal utility or minimal
rent constraints are reversed. The reason all these generalizations are pos-
sible is because all of these selections from the envy-free set satisfy money
monotonicity, i.e., starting from a given such allocation, each agent con-
tributes in welfare terms due to an increase in rent (Velez, 2017). All of the
properties of the maxmin utility envy-free allocations used in the proofs of
Lemmas 3-5 are shared by these selections (Velez, 2017, 2018).
Finally, our results about incentives generalize to the following family of
mechanisms. Let G ⊆ F be defined on a domain D, X ≡ X1 × · · · ×Xn a
message space, and ϕ : DN ×X → Z such that for each (u, x) ∈ DN ×X,
ϕ(u, x) ∈ G(u). The generalizes direct revelation mechanism associated
with G, X, and ϕ, which we denote by (N,DN ×X, (G,ϕ)), is that in which
each agent reports her preferences and a message (ui, xi) ∈ D × Xi, and
the outcome is the allocation chosen by ϕ for the profile of reports. The
complete information game induced by such a mechanism for some utility
profile u ∈ UN is (N,DN × X, (G,ϕ), u). Note that this game is well-
defined even if the true preference profile does not belong in the space of
possible reports. The generalized direct revelation mechanisms include the
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tie-breaker mechanisms of Velez and Thomson (2012) and Velez (2011), and
the fair rent division on a budget algorithm of Procaccia et al. (2018).
Appendix
Proofs of complexity results
Proof of Lemma1. Let Λ > 0 be such that for each a ∈ A such that
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), log Λ + (n− 1)maxi∈N,a∈A λia <
∑
i∈N λiσ(i).
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider a rebate and reshuffle at (r, σ), i.e., a vector
x ≡ (xa)a∈A ∈ R
A
++ and an assignment µ : N → A that induce alloca-
tion (r − x, µ). Since u and r will not change in the course of this proof,
for simplicity in the notation, for each i ∈ N , let λia ≡ λia(u, r) and
λˆia ≡ λia(u, r,Λ) for some Λ satisfying the property in Lemma 1. The
linearized economy of rebates and reshuffles with slopes λˆs is isomorphic to
a quasi-linear economy in which preferences are given by (ya, a) ∈ R×A 7→
uˆi(ya, a) ≡ log λˆia + ya.
Let ε > 0 be such that (i) for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A such that
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), we have that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra − 2ε, a); and
(ii) for each (i, a) ∈ SBu(r), ra − ε > bi. This ε is well defined because
preferences u are continuous.
Fix δ ∈ (0, ε].
Step 1 : Let (yδ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A y
δ
a) be such that
∑
a∈A exp(y
δ
a) =
δ. Let rδ ≡ (ra − exp(y
δ
a))a∈A. We claim that (r
δ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ).
Since
∑
a∈A exp(y
δ
a) = δ, and
∑
a∈A ra = m, then
∑
a∈A r
δ
a = m − δ.
Since
∑
a∈A exp(y
δ
a) = δ, for each a ∈ A, exp(y
δ
a) < δ ≤ ε. Since uˆ is
quasi-linear and γ admits an envy-free allocation for an economy with pref-
erences uˆ, γ maximizes the summation of values for uˆ (Svensson, 1983).
By Lemma 1, γ is a perfect matching in F(r). Thus, ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) =
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)). Thus, for each a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a), we
have that ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) = ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra−ε, a) ≥ ui(ra−δ, a). Thus,
ui(rγ(i)− exp(y
δ
γ(i)), γ(i)) > ui(ra− δ, a) > ui(ra− y
δ
a, a). Let A ∈ A be such
that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a). Since both (rγ(i), γ(i)) and (ra, a) maximize
ui among the bundles in (r, σ), we have that λˆiγ(i) = λiγ(i) and λˆia = λia.
Since ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) = ui(ra, a), ui(rγ(i) − y
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) ≥ ui(ra − y
δ
a, a) if
and only if λˆiγ(i) exp(y
δ
γ(i)) ≥ λˆia exp(y
δ
a). This happens if and only if
log λˆiγ(i)+ y
δ
γ(i) ≥ log λˆia+ y
δ
a. Now, log λˆiγ(i)+ y
δ
γ(i) ≥ log λˆia+ y
δ
a holds be-
cause (yδ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈ya
). Thus, ui(rγ(i)−exp(y
δ
γ(i)), γ(i)) ≥ ui(ra−
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exp(yδa), a). Thus, for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N , ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) ≥ ui(r
δ
γ(j), γ(j)).
Thus, (rδ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m− δ).
Step 2 : Let (rδ, γ) be a solution to
max
(rδ,γ)∈F (N,A,u,m−δ)
min
i∈N
ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)). (4)
We claim that for each maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(r), (rδ, µ)
is a solution to (4). Since (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m), for each a ∈ A, rδa < ra
(Alkan et al., 1991; Velez, 2017). By Lemma 1, Λ in our definition of λˆs
can be taken arbitrarily close to zero. Thus, we can suppose without loss of
generality that for each a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a) and each
b such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(rb, b),
log λib + log(rb − r
δ
b ) > log λˆia + log(ra − r
δ
a). (5)
For each a ∈ A, let yδa ≡ log(ra−r
δ
a). We claim that (y
δ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya).
Let i ∈ N . For each a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a),
ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) ≥ ui(r
δ
σ(i), σ(i)) > ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) >
ui(ra − ε, a) ≥ ui(ra − δ, a) > ui(r
δ
a, a),
where the first inequality holds because (rδ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ); the
second and last hold because for each a ∈ A, rδa < ra; the third holds by
the definition of ε; and the fourth holds because δ < ε. Since (rδ, γ) ∈
F (N,A, u,m − δ), γ(i) 6= a. Thus, ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) = ui(rσ(i), σ(i)). Thus,
for each i ∈ N , λˆiµ(i) = λiµ(i). Thus, by (5) for each a ∈ A such that
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a),
uˆi(y
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) = log λib + y
δ
γ(i) > log λˆia + log(ra − r
δ
a) = uˆi(y
δ
a, a).
Let a ∈ A be such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a). Then, λˆia = λia. Re-
call that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(rγ(i), γ(i)). Since (r
δ, γ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ),
ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) ≥ ui(r
δ
a, a). Thus, ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) − ui(rγ(i), γ(i)) ≥ ui(r
δ
a, a) −
ui(ra, a). Thus, λiµ(i)(rγ(i) − r
δ
γ(i)) ≥ λia(ra − r
δ
a). That is,
uˆi(y
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) = log λib + y
δ
γ(i) ≥ log λia + log(ra − r
δ
a) = uˆi(y
δ
a, a).
Since (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), for each a ∈ A, ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) ≥ ui(ra, a). Thus,
for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N , uˆi(y
δ
γ(i), γ(i)) ≥ ui(y
δ
γ(j), γ(j)). Thus, (y
δ, γ) ∈
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F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya). By our choice of Λ and since µ is a maximal weight per-
fect matching in Fu(r), µmaximizes the summation of values for quasi-linear
preference uˆ. Thus, there is an allocation in F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya) with as-
signment µ (Alkan et al., 1991). Thus, (yδ, µ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya) (Svens-
son, 2009). Since
∑
a∈A exp(ya) = δ, by Step 1, (r
δ, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m −
δ). By Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991), for each i ∈ N , ui(r
δ
µ(i), µ(i)) =
ui(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)). Thus, mini∈N ui(r
δ
µ(i), µ(i)) = minl∈L u(r
δ
γ(i), γ(i)). Thus,
(rδ, µ) is a solution to (4).
Step 3 : Concludes. Let µ be a maximal weight perfect matching in
Fu(r). Consider the function δ ∈ [0, ε] 7→ (rδ, µ) where (r0, µ) = (r, µ) and
for each δ > 0, (rδ, µ) is a solution to (4). Since µ is a perfect matching
in F(r), (r, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m). By Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991), for
each i ∈ N , ui(rµ(i), µ(i)) = ui(rσ(i), σ(i)). Since (r, σ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m),
we have that (r, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m). Thus, for each δ ∈ [0, ε], (rδ, µ) ∈
R(N,A, u,m − δ). Thus, for each pair 0 < δ < η < ε, and each i ∈ N ,
ui(r
η
µ(i), µ(i)) > ui(r
δ
µ(i), µ(i)), and for each a ∈ A, r
δ
a > r
η
a (Alkan et al.,
1991; Velez, 2017).
The following lemma allows us to easily prove Lemma 4. It’s proof, which
we omit, can be completed similarly to Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 8. Let u ∈ BN , ε > 0, (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), and (t, σ) ∈
F (N,A, u,m − ε) such that for each a ∈ A, ra > ta. Suppose that B
u(r) =
Bu(t). Then, there is Λ > 0 satisfying the property of Lemma 1, such that
(r − t, σ) ∈ F
(
N,A, (λia(u, r,Λ)(·))i∈N,a∈A ,
∑
a∈A
ra − ta
)
.
Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 8 there is a representation of preferences uˆ in
the linearized rebates and reshuffles economy at r satisfying the property of
Lemma 1, and such that (log(r−t), σ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A log(ra−ta)). Since
uˆ is quasi-linear, σ maximizes the summation of the values for uˆ (Svensson,
1983). Thus, σ is a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(r).
Proof of Lemma 5. Statement 1 follows from Lemma 3. Let ε ≡ ε((r, σ), u, µ).
Suppose that 0 < ε < +∞. Then, there is a sequence {δs}s∈N whose
limit is ε and such that for each s ∈ N, there is rs ∈ RA such that
(rs, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δs). For each δ > 0 there is a unique rδ ∈ RA
for which there is an assignment γ such that (rδ, γ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ)
(Alkan et al., 1991; Velez, 2017). Moreover, the function δ 7→ ϕ(δ) ≡ rδ is
continuous (Velez, 2017, Proposition 2). Thus, as s→ +∞, rs → rε. Since u
is continuous, (rε, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m−ε). Let (rε, γ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m−ε). By
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Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991), for each i ∈ N , ui(r
ε
µ(i), µ(i)) = ui(r
ε
γ(i), γ(i)).
Thus, (rε, µ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − ε). Let δ ∈ [0, ε). By definition of ε,
there is η > δ such that for each δ′ ∈ [0, η], there is r′ ∈ RA such that
(r′, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ′). Thus, there is rδ ∈ RA such that (rδ, µ) ∈
R(N,A, u,m − δ). Thus,
ε ∈ {ε′ > 0 : ∀δ ∈ [0, ε′],∃(rδ, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ)}.
Thus,
ε((r, σ), u, µ) = max{ε > 0 : ∀δ ∈ [0, ε],∃(rδ , µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − δ)}. (6)
We claim that µ is not a maximal weight perfect matching in Fu(rε). Sup-
pose the contrary. By Lemma 3, there is η > 0 such that for each δ ∈ [0, η],
there is rδ such that (rδ, µ) ∈ R(N,A, u,m − ε− δ). This contradicts, (6).
Finally, suppose that η > ε. We claim that there is no t ∈ RA such
that
∑
a∈A ta = m − η, B
u(t) = Bu(rε), and (t, µ) ∈ R(N,A, ur,m − η).
Suppose by contradiction that there is rη ∈ RA such that
∑
a∈A r
η
a = m−η,
(rη, µ) ∈ R(N,A, ur ,m − η). Since η > ε, for each a ∈ A, rεa > r
η
a (Alkan
et al., 1991; Velez, 2017). By Lemma 4, µ is a maximal weight perfect
matching in Fu(rε). This is a contradiction.
Proofs of results about incentives
Definition 5. For each u ∈ UN and i ∈ N let
F i(u) ≡ argmax
s∈F (u)
min
i∈N
ui(si).
The following lemma is used in the proof of the subsequent results.
Lemma 9. Let u ∈ UN , i ∈ N , vi ∈ U , and z ≡ (r, µ) ∈ F (u−i, vi). Then,
for each δ > 0, there is v′i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (u−i, v
′
i),
σ(i) = µ(i) and tµ(i) ≤ rµ(i) + δ.
Proof of Lemma 9. Let a ≡ µ(i) and (r′, γ) ∈ F i(u−i, vi). By Alkan et al.
(Lemma 3, 1991), r′a ≤ ra. Let u
′
i ∈ U be a preference that prefers (r
′
a, a) to
all other bundles at (r′, γ), i.e., such that for each b ∈ A \ {a}, u′i(r
′
a, a) >
u′i(r
′
b, b). Let (r
′′, γ′) ∈ F i(u−i, u
′
i). By Fujinaka and Wakayama (Lemma 3,
2015), r′′ = r′. Thus, γ′(i) = a. Let δ > 0. By Velez (Statement 3, Theorem
5.15, 2018), there is v′i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (u−i, v
′
i),
σ(i) = a and ta ≤ r
′′
a + δ = r
′
a + δ ≤ ra + δ.
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Definition 6. The envy-free graph for u ∈ U and z ∈ Z is Γ(u, z) ≡
(N,E) where (i, j) ∈ E if and only if ui(zi) = ui(zj). If there is a path from
i to j in Γ(u, z) we write i→u,z j.
Lemma 10. Let u ∈ UN , i ∈ N , vi ∈ U , z ≡ (r, µ) ∈ F (u−i, vi), and j ∈ N
such that j →u,z i. Then, for each δ > 0, there is v
′
i ∈ Q such that for each
(t, σ) ∈ F (u−i, v
′
i), σ(i) = µ(j) and tµ(j) ≤ rµ(j) + δ.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let u′i ∈ U be a preference that prefers (rµ(j), µ(j))
to all other bundles at (r, µ), i.e., such that for each a ∈ A \ {µ(j)},
u′i(rµ(j), µ(j)) > u
′
i(ra, a). Since j →u,z i, j →u−i,u′i,z i. Thus, there is
an allocation in s ∈ F (u−i, u
′
i) that is obtained by reshuffling z along the
path that defines j →u−i,u′i,z i. Thus, si = (rµ(j), µ(j)). By Lemma 9, for
each δ > 0, there is v′i ∈ Q such that for each (t, σ) ∈ F (u−i, v
′
i), σ(i) = µ(j)
and tµ(j) ≤ rµ(j) + δ.
Definition 7. For each M ⊆ N , C ⊆ A, u ∈ U(C)N , l ∈ R, and a ∈ C let
F a(M,C, u, l) ≡ argmax
(r,µ)∈F (M,C,u,l)
ra.
Lemma 11. There is a constant θ > 0 such that for each M ⊆ N , C ⊆ A
such that |C| = |N |, u ∈ B(C)N , a ∈ A, (t, σ) ∈ F a(M,C, u, l), ε > 0, and
(r, µ) ∈ F a(M,C, u, l + ε),
ra − ta ≥ θε.
Proof of Lemma 11. Fix a ∈ A, z ≡ (r, µ), and s ≡ (t, σ) as in the statement
of the lemma. By Alkan et al. (Theorem 4 1991), for each b ∈ A, tb < rb;
by Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991) for each j ∈ N , uj(sj) > uj(zj).
Step 1: For each j ∈ N , rµ(j) − tµ(j) ≤ (rσ(j) − tσ(j))(1 + ρ). Since
s ∈ F (u), uj(tµ(j), µ(j)) ≤ uj(tσ(j), σ(j)). Since z ∈ F (u), uj(rµ(k), µ(k)) ≥
uj(tµ(j), µ(j)). Thus,
rµ(j) − tµ(j) ≤ uj(tµ(j), µ(j)) − uj(tµ(j), µ(j))
≤ uj(tσ(j) − uj(tσ(j), σ(j))
≤ (rσ(j) − tσ(j))(1 + ρ),
(7)
where the first and last inequality hold because uj ∈ B(C).
Step 2: For each (j, i) ∈ Γ(u, s), rµ(j) − tµ(j) ≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ).
Let x ∈ R be such that uj(x, σ(i)) = uj(zj). Since uj(zj) < uj(sj) =
uj(tσ(i), σ(i)) and preferences are money-monotone, x > tσ(i). Since z ∈
F (u), uj(x, σ(i)) = uj(zj) ≥ uj(rσ(i), σ(i)). Thus, rσ(i) ≥ x > tσ(i). Thus,
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x− tσ(i) ≤ rσ(i)− tσ(i). Since s ∈ F (u), ui(tµ(j), µ(j)) ≤ uj(tσ(i), σ(i)). Since
uj(rµ(j), µ(j)) = uj(zj) = uj(x, σ(i)),
rµ(j) − tµ(j) ≤ ui(tµ(j), µ(j)) − uj(rµ(j), µ(j))
≤ uj(tσ(i), σ(i))− uj(x, σ(i))
≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ),
(8)
where the first and last inequalities hold because uj ∈ B(C).
Step 3: For each (j, i) ∈ Γ(u, s), rσ(j) − tσ(j) ≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ)
n.
By Step 2, rµ(j) − tµ(j) ≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ). Let j1 ∈ N be such that
σ(j1) = µ(j). Thus, rσ(j1) − tσ(j1) ≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ). Thus, if j1 = j,
our step is proved. Suppose that j1 6= j. By Step 1, rµ(j1) − tµ(j1) ≤
(rσ(i)tσ(i))(1 + ρ)
2. Suppose that we have found {j1, ..., jm} ⊆ N \ {j},
different agents such that σ(j1) = µ(j), σ(j2) = µ(j1),..., σ(jm) = µ(jm−1);
and rµ(jm) − tµ(jm) ≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ)
m+1. Let k ∈ N such that σ(k) =
µ(jm). Then, rσ(k) − tσ(k) ≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ)
m+1. We claim that k 6∈
{j1, ..., jm}. Suppose by contradiction that k = jl for some l ∈ {1, ...,m}.
If l = 1, σ(k) = µ(j). Thus, jm = j. A contradiction. If l > 1, σ(k) =
µ(jl−1). Thus, jm = jl−1. This contradicts {j1, ..., jm} are all different
agents. Thus, either k = j or k ∈ N \ {j, j1, ..., jm}. In the former case,
rσ(j) − tσ(j) ≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ)
m+1, which proves our step. In the later
case let jm+1 = k. Thus, {j1, ..., jm+1} ⊆ N \ {j} are all different agents.
By Step 2, rµ(k) − tµ(k) ≤ (rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ)
m+2. Since N is finite, by
repeating the preceding argument we eventually find that rσ(j) − tσ(j) ≤
(rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ)
n.
Step 4: Concludes. Let i ∈ N be such that µ(i) = a. By Velez
(Proposition 1 2011), for each j ∈ N , j →u,s i. By Step 3, rσ(j) − tσ(j) ≤
(rσ(i) − tσ(i))(1 + ρ)
n×n. Thus,
ε =
∑
j∈N
rσ(j) − tσ(j) ≤ n(ra − ta)(1 + ρ)
n×n.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let v ∈ QN , z ≡ (r, µ) ∈ F (v), i ∈ N , and ui ∈ U . Let
j ∈ N . Suppose that ui(zj) > ui(zi). Let y be such that ui(rµ(j)−y, µ(j)) =
ui(zi). Since preferences are continuous and satisfy money-monotonicity
there is a unique such a y and y > 0. There are two cases.
Case 1: j →v,z i. Then, j →v−i,ui,z i. Let u
′
i ∈ U be indifferent
among all bundles in z. Thus, there is an allocation in F (v−i, u
′
i), obtained
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by reshuffling along the chain that defines j →v−i,ui,z i, at which agent i
receives zj . By Lemma 9, for each ω2 ∈ (0, 1) there is v
′
i ∈ Q such that for
each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v−i, v
′
i), σ(i) = µ(j) and ui(si) ≥ ui
(
rµ(j) + ω2y, µ(j)
)
.
Case 2: It is not the case that j →v,z i. Let u
′
i ∈ U be a utility function
that is indifferent between zi and for each j ∈ N \ {i}, (rµ(j) − x, µ(j)). By
choosing x sufficiently large we can guarantee that for each j ∈ N \ {i}, if
u′i(tµ(j), µ(j)) ≥ u
′
i(zj), then
ui(tµ(j), µ(j)) ≥ ui(rµ(j), µ(j)). (9)
Let u′ ≡ (v−i, u
′
i). Since zi is the preferred bundle of u
′
i among all bundles
at z and z ∈ F (v), z ∈ F (u′). Let M ≡ {k ∈ N : k →u′,z i} and L = N \M .
Then i ∈ M and for each k ∈ M and each h ∈ N \M , u′h(zh) > u
′
h(zk).
Since it is not the case that j →v,z i, it is not the case that j →u′,z i.
Thus, j ∈ L 6= ∅. Let ϕ be a function that assigns to each l ∈ R an
allocation in ϕ(l) ∈ Fµ(i)(M,µ(M), u′M , l). For each b ∈ µ(M), let rb(l)
be the rent payment of the agent who receives room b at ϕ(l). Then, by
Velez (Proposition 2 2017), rb is a continuous strictly increasing function and
l 7→ u′i(ϕ(l)i) is a continuous strictly decreasing function. By Velez (2017,
Corollary 1 and Proposition2), there is a function ψ that assigns to each
l ∈ R and allocation ψ(l) ∈ F (L, µ(L), uL, l) such that (1) ψ(
∑
a∈µ(L) ra) =
zL, (2) if for each b ∈ µ(L) and each x ∈ R, rb(x) is the rent payment of
the agent who receives room b at ψ(x), rb is a continuous strictly increasing
function; and (3) for each i ∈ L, x 7→ ui(ψ(x)i) is a continuous strictly
decreasing function. Let lM ≡
∑
a∈µ(M) ra and lL ≡
∑
a∈µ(L) ra. Consider
the set
D ≡
{
δ ∈ R : ∀k ∈M,∀j ∈ L, u′j
(
ψ (LL + δ)j
)
≥ u′j
(
ϕ (lM − δ)j
)}
.
Recall that for each k ∈ M and each h ∈ L, u′h(zh) > u
′
h(zk). Thus, 0 ∈ D
and all the inequalities that define D hold strictly for δ = 0. Since for each
b ∈ µ(M), the function rb is continuous and for each k ∈ L, the function
l 7→ u′k(ψ(l)k) is also continuous, there is δ > 0 in D. Since for each k ∈M ,
l 7→ u′k(ϕ(l)k) is increasing, ϕ(lM − δ) ∈ F (M,µ(M), u
′
M , lM − δ), and
ψ(lL + δ) ∈ F (L, µ(L), uL, lL + δ), for each δ ∈ D, (ϕ(lM − δ), ψ(lL + δ)) ∈
F (u′). Since F (u′) is a compact set, D is bounded above. Let δ1 be the
supremum of D. By the same argument above, if all inequalities that define
D are strict at δ1, there is δ > δ1 in δ. Thus, δ1 is the maximum of D. Let
z1 ≡ (r1, µ1) ≡ (ϕ(lM − δ1), ψ(lL + δ1)) ∈ F (u
′). Thus, there is h ∈ L and
k ∈M such that uh(z
1
h) = uh(z
1
k). Let i1 be the agent who receives µ(i) at z
1.
Since z1M ∈ F
µ(i)(M,µ(M), uM , lM ), by Velez (Proposition 1 2011), for each
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k ∈ M , k →u′,z1 i1. Thus, there is h ∈ L such that l →u′,z1 i1. Let M1 ≡
{k ∈ N : k →u′,z1 i1} and L = N \M1. Since z
1 = (ϕ(lM − δ1), ψ(lL + δ1)),
M1 )M and µ
1(M1) ) µ(M). By repeating this process 1 ≤ m ≤ n times,
one constructs {z0 ≡ (r0, µ0), z1 ≡ (r1, µ1), ..., zm ≡ (rm, µm)} ⊆ F (u′)
and {δ1, ..., δm} all positive amounts, such that: (1) z0 = z. (2) for each
k ∈ {1, ...,m}, denote by ik the agent who receives object µ(i) at z
k and by
jk the agent who receives object µ(j) at z
k,Mk ≡ {h ∈ N : h→u′,zk ik}, and
Lk ≡ N \Mk; then for each k = 1, ...m, Mk−1 (Mk, µ(i) ∈ µ
k−1(Mk−1) (
µk(Mk), Lk ( Lk−1; for each k = 0, ...,m − 1, µ(j) ∈ µ
k(Lk); and µ(j) ∈
µm(Mm). (3) for each k = 1, ...,m, z
k ∈ F (u′); for each h ∈ Mk−1, r
k−1
µ(h) >
rk
µ(h); for each h ∈ Lk−1, r
k−1
µ(h) < r
k
µ(h); and z
k
Mk−1
= ϕ(lMk−1 − δk) where
lMk−1 ≡
∑
a∈µk−1(Mk−1)
rk−1a and ϕ is a function that assigns to each l an
allocation ϕ(l) ∈ Fµ(i)(Mk−1, µ
k−1(Mk−1), uMk−1 , l). Let ∆ ≡ δ1+ · · ·+ δm.
By Lemma 11, for each k = 1, ...,m, rk−1
µ(i) − r
k
µ(i) ≥ θδk. Thus, r
0
µ(i)− r
m
µ(i) ≥
θ∆. Since for each k = 0, 1, ...,m − 1, and each h ∈ Lk, r
k
µ(h) < r
k+1
µ(h), and
µ(j) ∈ µk(Lk), we have that r
m
µ(j) − r
0
µ(j) < ∆. There are two cases.
Case 2.1. µm(i) 6= µ(i). Since rm
µ(i) < r
0
µ(i), and {z
0, zm} ⊆ F (v−i, u
′
i),
by Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991), u′i(z
m
i ) > u
′
i(z
0). By (9), ui(z
m
i ) > ui(z
0
j ).
By Lemma 9, for each η > 0, there is v′i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈
F (v−i, v
′
i), σ(i) = µ
m(i) and ui(si) ≥ ui
(
rµm(j) + η, µ
m(j)
)
. Thus, for each
ω2 ∈ (0, 1), there is v
′
i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v−i, v
′
i),
ui(si) ≥ ui
(
rµ(j), µ(j)
)
> ui
(
rµ(j) + ω2y, µ(j)
)
.
Case 2.2. µm(i) = µ(i). Since r0
µ(i) − r
m
µ(i) ≥ θ∆, ui(z
m
i ) ≥ ui(rµ(i) −
θ∆, µ(i)). Since rm
µ(j)− r
0
µ(j) < ∆, ui(r
m
µ(j), µ(j)) ≥ ui(rµ(j)+∆, µ(j)). Since
µ(j) ∈ µm(Mm), jm →v−i,u′i,zm i where µ
m(jm) = µ(j). Suppose that ∆ ≤
y/2. Since zm ∈ F (v−i, u′i), by Lemma 10, there is v
′
i ∈ Q such that for each
s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v−i, v
′
i), σ(i) = µ(j) and ui(si) ≥ ui
(
rµ(j) +∆+ y/4, µ(j)
)
≥
ui (rj + 3y/4, µ(j)). Finally, suppose that ∆ > y/2. Since z
m ∈ F (v−i, u
′
i),
by Lemma 9, there is v′i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v−i, v
′
i), σ(i) =
µ(i) and ui(si) ≥ ui
(
rµ(i) − θ∆+ θ∆/2, µ(i)
)
= ui
(
rµ(i) − θ∆/2, µ(i)
)
Thus,
for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v−i, v
′
i), ui(si) ≥ ui
(
rµ(i) − θy/2, µ(i)
)
.
Summarizing, in all cases, there is v′i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈
F (v−i, v
′
i),
ui(si) ≥ min
{
ui
(
rµ(i) − θy/2, µ(i)
)
, ui
(
rµ(j) + 3y/4, µ(j)
)}
.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let z ≡ (r, µ) be a limit equilibrium of (N,DN , g, u). We
29
claim that z ∈ F (u). Suppose by contradiction that there are {i, j} ⊆ N ,
such that ui(zj) > ui(zi). Let δ > 0 be such that ui(rj + δ, µ(j)) = ui(zi).
Let (vε, xε) be a sequence of ε-equilibria of (N,DN , g, u), whose respective
outcomes are zε ≡ (rε, µε) ∈ g(vε) ∈ F (vε), such that as ε vanishes, zε → z.
We can suppose without loss of generality that for each ε, µε = µ. Let
δε ∈ R be such that ui(r
ε
µ(j) − δ
ε, µ(j)) = ui(z
ε
i ). Let {ω1, ω2} ⊆ (0, 1)
be the coefficients in Theorem 6. Since preferences are continuous and as ε
vanishes, zε → z, there is η > 0 such that for each ε < η, δ+(1/ω2−1)δ/2 >
δε ≥ δ/2 > 0, rε
µ(i) ≤ rµ(i) +
ω1
4 δ, r
ε
µ(j) < rµ(j) + +
1−ω2
4 . Since D ⊆ B, by
Theorem 6 there is v′i ∈ Q ⊆ D such that, for each s ∈ F (v
ε
−i, v
′
i),
ui(si) ≥ min
{
ui
(
rεµ(i) − ω1δ
ε, µ(i)
)
, ui
(
rεµ(j) + ω2δ
ε, µ(j)
)}
.
Since δ + (1/ω2 − 1)δ/2 > δ
ε ≥ δ/2 > 0,
ui(si) ≥ min
{
ui
(
rεµ(i) −
ω1
2
δ, µ(i)
)
, ui
(
rεµ(j) +
1 + ω2
2
δ, µ(j)
)}
.
Since rε
µ(i) ≤ rµ(i) +
ω1
4 δ and r
ε
µ(j) < rµ(j) +
1−ω2
4 ,
ui(si) ≥ min
{
ui
(
rµ(i) −
ω1
4
δ, µ(i)
)
, ui
(
rεµ(j) +
3 + ω2
4
δ, µ(j)
)}
.
Let
ε¯ ≡ min
{
ui
(
rµ(i) −
ω1
4
δ, µ(i)
)
, ui
(
rεµ(j) +
3 + ω2
4
δ, µ(j)
)}
− ui(zi).
Since ω1 > 0 and ω2 < 1, ε¯ > 0. Thus, for each ε < η, for each x
′
i ∈ Xi,
ui(ϕ(v
ε
−i, v
′
i, x
ε
−i, x
′
i)) ≥ ui(zi)+ε¯. Since as ε vanishes, z
ε → z, we can further
select ε < ε¯/2 such that ui(z
ε
i ) − ui(zi) < ε¯/2. Thus, for each x
′
i ∈ Xi,
ui(ϕ(v
ε
−i, v
′
i, x
ε
−i, x
′
i)) ≥ ui(zi) + ε¯ > ui(z
ε
i ) + ε¯/2 > ui(z
ε
i ) + ε. Thus, v
ε is
not an ε-equilibrium of (N,DN , g, u). This is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let u ∈ UN and z ≡ (r, µ) ∈ F (u). Let vε ∈ QN be
the profile such that for each i ∈ N and each j ∈ N \ {i}, vεi (rµ(i) + ε/(n −
1), µ(i)) = vεi (rµ(j) − ε/(n − 1)
2, µ(j)). Thus, each agent i assigns a value
to the object they consume at z that is ε(1/(n − 1) + 1/(n − 1)2) greater
than the value of each other object. Let x ∈ X. We claim that (vε, x) is
an ε-equilibrium of (N,DN , g, u). Let s ∈ F (vε), then s is Pareto efficient.
Thus, each agent receives µ(i) at s. Thus, s = (t, µ). We claim that for
each i ∈ N , tµ(i) ≤ rµ(i) + ε/(n − 1). Suppose that there is i ∈ N such that
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tµ(i) > rµ(i)+ ε/(n− 1). Since
∑
j∈N tµ(j) =
∑
j∈N rµ(j), there is j ∈ N such
that tµ(j) < rµ(j) − ε/(n− 1)
2. Thus, ui(sj) > ui(si) and s 6∈ F (v
ε). This is
a contradiction. Since for each i ∈ N , tµ(i) ≤ rµ(i)+ ε/(n− 1), then for each
i ∈ N , tµ(i) ≥ rµ(i) − ε. Let i ∈ N . By Fujinaka and Wakayama (Lemma
3, 2015), for each s ∈ F i(vε−i, ui), tµ(i) ≥ rµ(i) − ε. Thus, for each s ∈
F i(vε−i, ui), ui(si) ≤ ui(zi) + ε. By Fujinaka and Wakayama (Statement 1,
Theorem 1, 2015), for each v′i ∈ U and each s ∈ F (v
ε
−i, v
′
i), ui(si) ≤ ui(zi)+ε.
Thus, for each v′i ∈ U and each x
′
i ∈ Xi, s ≡ ϕ(v
ε
−i, v
′
i, xi, x
′
i) ∈ F (v
ε
−i, v
′
i) is
such that ui(si) ≤ ui(zi) + ε. Let (t
ε, µ) = ϕ(vε, x). Then, for each i ∈ N ,
ri − ε ≤ t
ε
i ≤ ri + ε/(n − 1). Thus, as ε vanishes, (t
ε, µ) → z. Thus, z is a
limit equilibrium of (N,DN , g, u).
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Appendix not for publication
Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division on a budget
Rodrigo Velez
February 11, 2019
We present the proofs omitted in the paper.
Proof of Lemma 8. Consider a rebate and reshuffle at (r, σ), i.e., a vector
x ≡ (xa)a∈A ∈ R
A
++ and an assignment µ : N → A that induce allo-
cation (r − x, µ). Since u and r will not change in the course of this
proof, for simplicity in the notation, for each i ∈ N , let λia ≡ λia(u, r)
and λˆia ≡ λia(u, r,Λ) for some Λ satisfying the property in Lemma 1.
The linearized economy of rebates and reshuffles with slopes λˆs is isomor-
phic to a quasi-linear economy in which preferences are given by (ya, a) ∈
R × A 7→ uˆi(ya, a) ≡ log λˆia + ya. By Lemma 1, Λ can be chosen arbi-
trarily close to zero. Thus, we can suppose without loss of generality that
for each a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a) and each b such that
ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(rb, b),
log λib + log(rb − tb) > log λˆia + log(ra − ta). (10)
For each a ∈ A, let ya ≡ log(ra−ta). We claim that (y, γ) ∈ F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya).
Since (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), for each i ∈ N , λˆiµ(i) = λiµ(i). Thus, by (10)
for each a ∈ A such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) > ui(ra, a),
uˆi(yσ(i), σ(i)) = log λib + yσ(i) > log λˆia + log(ra − ta) = uˆi(ya, a).
Let a ∈ A be such that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(ra, a). Then, λˆia = λia. Re-
call that ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) = ui(rσ(i), σ(i)). Since (t, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m − δ),
ui(tσ(i), σ(i)) ≥ ui(ta, a). Thus, ui(tσ(i), σ(i)) − ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) ≥ ui(ta, a) −
ui(ra, a). Thus, λiµ(i)(rσ(i) − tσ(i)) ≥ λia(ra − ta). That is,
uˆi(yσ(i), σ(i)) = log λib + yσ(i) ≥ log λia + log(ra − ta) = uˆi(ya, a).
Since (r, σ) ∈ F (N,A, u,m), for each a ∈ A, ui(rσ(i), σ(i)) ≥ ui(ra, a). Thus,
for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N , uˆi(yσ(i), σ(i)) ≥ uˆi(yσ(j), σ(j)). Thus, (y, σ) ∈
F (N,A, uˆ,
∑
a∈A ya). By Λ1, σ maximizes the summation of values for quasi-
linear preference uˆ.
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